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This paper proposes a model where heterogeneous firms choose whether to undertake R&D 
or not. Innovative firms are more productive, have larger investment opportunities and lower 
own funds for necessary tangible continuation investments than non-innovating firms. As a 
result, they are financially constrained while standard firms are not. The efficiency of the 
financial sector and a country’s institutional quality relating to corporate finance determine 
the share of R&D intensive firms and their comparative advantage in producing innovative 
goods. We illustrate how protection, R&D subsidies, and financial sector development 
improve access to external finance in distinct ways, support the expansion of innovative 
industries, and boost national welfare. International welfare spillovers depend on the 
interaction between terms of trade effects and financial frictions and may be positive or 
negative, depending on foreign countries’ trade position. 
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Despite their large investment opportunities, innovative ﬁrms are more frequently ﬁnance
constrained than less innovative ones due to credit rationing (see Brown, Ongena, Popov,
and Ye¸ sin, 2011). R&D intensive sectors are thus ﬁnancially dependent in the sense of
Rajan and Zingales (1998). This paper sheds light on the mechanisms determining (en-
dogenous) ﬁn a n c ec o n s t r a i n t si nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁrms’ discrete R&D decisions and their
consequences for tangible investment, comparative advantage, and trade. We assume
that ﬁnance constraints root in a moral hazard problem in the relationship between en-
trepreneurs and outside investors as postulated in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) or Tirole
(2001, 2006). For external funding to be incentive compatible, entrepreneurs must keep
a minimum stake which limits the share of income pledgable to outside investors. Hence,
the level of pledgable income determines a ﬁrm’s debt capacity, i.e., the level of external
credit it can raise from banks and outside investors.
Unlike in other models of real eﬀects of ﬁnance, we distinguish between passive, stan-
dard banks and active ﬁnancial intermediaries who engage in monitoring of investment
projects. Entities we have in mind with the latter are venture capitalists, specialized
investment banks, ‘Hausbanken’, or other intermediaries engaged in relationship banking.
Modeling the banking sector as to be perfectly competitive, extra costs of monitoring have
to be matched by associated extra beneﬁts. More expensive credit from active banks is
not suitable to all ﬁrms. However, if standard banks are not willing to ﬁnance invest-
ment projects at the desired scale, there may be room for active banks to serve ﬁrms
with high investment opportunities and to help them raising a larger amount of exter-
nal funds for investment. Then, passive and active ﬁnancial intermediaries may coexist.
The extra costs of monitoring imply a higher cost of capital when ﬁnancing investment
through credit from active banks. However, monitoring is productive in the sense that it
reduces private beneﬁts from managerial misbehavior. This entails a certiﬁcation func-
tion of active ﬁnancial intermediaries, which leads also standard banks to lend more to
monitored (certiﬁed) entrepreneurs than they would in the absence of monitoring. Hence,
1monitoring is beneﬁcial for an economy at large by incentivizing entrepreneurs, raising
ﬁrms’ debt capacity, and improving access to external credit. Altogether, this boosts ﬁrm
value through the greater realization of productive investment opportunities. If moni-
toring helps exploiting otherwise unused investment opportunities with high returns of
constrained ﬁrms suﬃciently, credit from active banks becomes valuable to innovative
ﬁrms in spite of being more expensive than credit from standard bank ﬁnancing.1 We
model and interpret ﬁnancial sector development as a productivity improvement of active
banks in performing monitoring at a given marginal cost. As a consequence, a country
whose ﬁnancial sector develops will relax ﬁnance constraints, encourage innovation, and
raise tangible investments and the value of constrained (innovative) ﬁrms.2 In this way,
ﬁnancial sector development becomes a source of comparative advantage in innovative
sectors. Such a framework allows for a deeper modeling of the sources of ﬁnancial con-
straints and ﬁnancial development relative to previous work on the eﬀects of ﬁnance on
the real economy.
We consider countries with two sectors: a standard, non-innovative sector where ﬁrms
display low productivity, have limited investment opportunities, and are not ﬁnance con-
strained so that the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem applies; and an innovative sec-
tor where ﬁrms are potentially constrained in their access to external ﬁnance. Innovative
1This notion is consistent with at least two stylized facts: (i) innovative ﬁrms often require more
sophisticated forms of ﬁnance (see Gompers and Lerner, 2001), and (ii) active ﬁnancial intermediaries
typically specialize in ﬁnancing more innovative ﬁrms and help them grow larger. Sorensen (2007) shows
that better investors match with better ﬁrms and also actively support them. Bottazzi et al. (2008)
show that investor activism is human capital intensive and promotes ﬁrm performance by helping with
fundraising and other managerial support. Venture capital accounts for a rather small part of total
investment but is concentrated in the most innovative sectors. Kortum and Lerner (2000) found that VC
is responsible for a disproportionately large share of overall industrial innovation in the U.S.
2Financial development is captured by monitoring technology parameters in our model. Of course,
the amount of credit channeled through active banks is endogenous to those and other (e.g., product
market) parameters. The model suggests that measuring ﬁnancial development by the extent of credit
administered by active banks may be misleading, since the demand for such credit on innovative ﬁrms’
part inter alia depends on fundamental parameters which are unrelated to ﬁnancial development.
2sector production is driven by entrepreneurial ﬁrms which are heterogeneous in their early
stage survival probabilities. After entry, they decide whether or not to undertake a dis-
crete R&D investment with two consequences: (i) R&D spending uses up own assets and
(ii) creates higher productivity which results in better subsequent tangible investment
opportunities and, hence, a larger optimal scale of expansion investment. These ﬁrms
are the prototype of highly productive growth companies with few own assets and large
tangible investment opportunities. They are ﬁnancially dependent and require a high
amount of external funds. How many of the entrepreneurial ﬁrms adopt an aggressive
R&D strategy, how much continuation investment they undertake, and to which extent
it is constrained is endogenously determined by our model. Hence, the model determines
the extensive and intensive margins of capital investments by and ﬁnancial constraints of
innovative ﬁrms.
We utilize this framework to study consequences of three alternative policy instruments
which address ﬁnancial frictions in distinct ways for (small or large) open economies.3 The
key results are the following. First, in raising the domestic price and earnings per ﬁrm,
import protection ceteris paribus raises proﬁts and boosts the debt capacity of constrained
ﬁrms. Import protection thereby relaxes ﬁnance constraints and allows innovative ﬁrms
with an excess rate of return to invest at a larger scale. For this reason, in the presence
of ﬁnancial frictions to innovative ﬁrms with high tangible investment opportunities, a
small level of protection can raise domestic welfare, provided that terms of trade eﬀects
in the importing country are small. The latter is an argument in favor of protection
which is related to ones brought forward in the context of infant industry protection in
the absence of ﬁnancial frictions (see Clemhout and Wan, 1970; and Mayer, 1984). A
key argument for infant industry protection in industrial economics was the existence of
informational barriers which may prevent consumers to enter a contract with producers so
that consumer experience was needed and, by protecting an infant industry, information
3See Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) and Baldwin (1989) for early work on the impact of ﬁnancial frictions
in economies which are open to goods trade and Ju and Wei (2008) and Antras and Caballero (2009) for
considering ﬁnancial frictions in economies which are open to goods trade and capital ﬂows.
3costs were lowered.4 In our model, gains from protection arise from informational barriers
between producers and ﬁnancial intermediaries (rather than consumers).5
Second, R&D subsidies boost innovation and lead to welfare gains, not because of
knowledge spillovers which are excluded in our model,6 but because they increase own
funds which, in turn, renders innovating ﬁrms ceteris paribus more successful in attracting
external investors.7 A l t o g e t h e r ,t h i sa l l o w st h e mt om o r ef u l l ye x p l o i tp r o ﬁtable invest-
ment opportunities with an excess rate of return and renders R&D investments yet more
proﬁtable to entrepreneurs. Akin to and beyond protection, an R&D subsidization policy
boosts national welfare and shifts comparative advantage towards the innovative sector.
Finally, we investigate the consequences of ﬁnancial sector development in terms of
improved monitoring productivity of active ﬁnancial intermediaries. Since monitoring
is useful only for ﬁnancially constrained, innovative ﬁrms, those consequences are qual-
itatively similar to the ones of the other two instruments: ﬁnancial sector development
relaxes ﬁnance constraints in the innovative sector, raises ﬁrms’ debt capacity, and boosts
national welfare. The quality of the ﬁnancial sector becomes a source of comparative
advantage in the R&D intensive and ﬁnancially dependent sector.
While all three policies reduce ﬁnancial frictions in the innovative sector and yield
4In international economics, that argument has been taken with some scepticism (see Corden, 1974;
Grossman and Horn, 1988). The debate between Mayer (1984) and Grossman and Horn (1988) illustrated
that the desirability of such protection depends on the nature and time structure of the information
asymmetry between consumers and producers.
5Notwithstanding, since protection entails a discriminatory treatment not only of domestic and foreign
ﬁrms but also of innovative and standard sector ﬁrms as is assumed here, other instruments as discussed
in the paper will have less distorting eﬀects and are preferable to protection of the innovative sector.
6R&D subsidies are widely discussed in the literature on endogenous growth as a means to reduce
market failures associated with external economies to R&D. Grossman and Helpman (1991) discuss
beneﬁcial eﬀects of R&D subsidies in situations where R&D generates positive spillovers to consumers
and succeeding innovators. In our context, R&D subsidies remove market failures related to limited
access to external credit which leads to underinvestment and an associated excess return on investment.
7Unlike as in a frictionless Modigliani-Miller world, investment is sensitive to cash-ﬂow and own assets
in our setting with ﬁnancial constraints.
4welfare gains at home, their consequences on foreign welfare are not uniform and depend
on the speciﬁc interaction of terms of trade eﬀects and ﬁnancial frictions. In general,
policies which reduce the world price of innovative goods strongly hurt foreign exporters
of that good, not only because of negative terms of trade eﬀects, but also because lower
prices tighten ﬁnance constraints. In foreign import countries of innovative goods, a lower
price of innovative goods yields positive terms of trade eﬀects which tend to oﬀset the
negative consequences on ﬁnancial frictions.
The novelty of the contributions of the present paper in comparison to earlier work on
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on the real side of open economies may be summarized
as follows. First, rather than treating ﬁnancial constraints as an exogenous parameter,
they emerge endogenously through a discrete innovation choice of heterogeneous ﬁrms
and the associated tangible investment opportunities in combination with deep character-
istics of the ﬁnancial industry such as a co-existence of standard and active banks. The
latter engage in monitoring and provide credit types of heterogeneous costs. Endogenous
ﬁnance constraints aﬀect the extensive and the intensive margin of constrained tangible
investment in an economy as well as average productivity and R&D intensity in the in-
novative sector. The severeness of ﬁnancing constraints depends inter alia on structural
parameters of active ﬁnancial intermediation. While active banking is more costly than
standard banking, it brings about the aforementioned certiﬁcation eﬀect for entrepreneurs
and R&D projects which leads to greater supply and, in turn, more demand for credit as
a whole, from active as well as standard banks. However, a better monitoring technology
reduces the costs of the certiﬁcation eﬀect so that the demand for active banking, and the
volume of credit transmitted through active banks will rise endogenously in the model.
Second, we analyze and compare three diﬀerent policy instruments — protection of the
innovative sector, R&D subsidies, and ﬁnancial development — with regard to their impact
on ﬁnancial constraints, national equilibrium, and the pattern of a country’s trade. In
doing so, we emphasize the importance of diﬀerences in ﬁnancial sector eﬃciency across
countries as captured by the monitoring technology parameters of active ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries. Third, we provide a complete analysis of national and international welfare
5consequences of these policy alternatives for small and large countries and show how they
depend on the interaction between terms of trade eﬀects and ﬁnancial frictions.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature review. Section 3
sets up the model, Section 4 analyzes equilibrium and comparative static eﬀects of policy
intervention in a small open economy, and Section 5 turns to policy eﬀects in a large
economy in world equilibrium. The concluding section summarizes the key insights.
2R e a l E ﬀects of Finance: Empirical Evidence
The main building blocks of our model — both with regard to the sources and the conse-
quences of ﬁnance constraints — are well backed by empirical evidence. In what follows,
we will summarize ﬁndings which surfaced in empirical work on the roots as well as the
consequences of ﬁnance constraints.
In a seminal paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that, at the macro level, poorly de-
veloped ﬁnancial markets in a country are one important reason for ﬁnancing constraints
which impair the growth of companies dependent on external ﬁnance. Similarly, access to
external ﬁnance is more constrained in countries with poorly developed property rights
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008). Moreover, work by Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1991), Schaller (1993), and Chirinko and Schaller (1995) points to infor-
mation asymmetries between ﬁnancial intermediaries and ﬁrms as a source of ﬁnancing
constraints: when ﬁrms have close ties to banks, the informational asymmetry is reduced,
and they are more likely to obtain the required funding for their projects. There is evi-
dence that such ﬁnancing constraints are particularly severe for small ﬁrms (see Fisman
and Love, 2003; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005, 2008; Aghion, Fally, and
Scarpetta, 2007). It appears that ﬁrm size matters for external credit even in developed
countries with relatively developed ﬁnancial markets.
In diﬀerentiating by ﬁrm size, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) ﬁnd
that ﬁnancing constraints are most relevant for small ﬁrms. As ﬁnancial and institutional
6characteristics improve, constraints become less tight. Small ﬁrms catch up and beneﬁtt h e
most. These results are conﬁrmed by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) who
focus on the importance of alternative sources of ﬁnance for small and large ﬁrms. Well
developed property rights boost external ﬁnancing in small ﬁrms more strongly than in
large ﬁrms. The increase mainly results from easier access to bank credit. Other sources of
ﬁnance are not able to compensate for lacking access to bank ﬁnancing. The same ﬁnding
is reported by Fisman and Love (2003) who study trade credit as an alternative funding
source when ﬁnancial markets are poorly developed. The importance of ﬁrm size for
ﬁnancial market access is already apparent when a ﬁrm is created (see Aghion, Fally, and
Scarpetta, 2007). Financial development most strongly raises entry rates of smaller ﬁrms
whereas entry of larger ﬁrms displays no or even a negative response. Even in advanced
economies, there is scope to promote entry of small ﬁrms and their subsequent growth by
improving institutions. Moreover, ﬁnancial constraints are stronger for ﬁrms which can
not oﬀer much collateral to outside investors. This leads to an industry pattern in the
intensity of ﬁnancial constraints and suggests that innovative ﬁrms — with a low degree of
asset tangibility — are ceteris paribus more constrained (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994;
Guiso, 1998; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000; Ughetto, 2008, 2009; Bloom, Griﬃth and Van
Reenen, 2002; Hall, 2002; Brown and Petersen, 2009; Hall and Lerner, 2009).
In response to such ﬁnancing constraints, ﬁrms conduct less investments than they
would otherwise. Unlike in a Modigliani-Miller world without ﬁnancing constraints, this
leads investments to depend on cash ﬂow (see Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991;
Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Schaller, 1993; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Chirinko and
Schaller, 1995; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Hubbard, 1998,
provides a survey of such evidence). By inﬂuencing investment, ﬁnancing constraints have
been shown to inﬂuence a country’s comparative advantage in terms of its sectoral trade
structure by impairing production and (net-)exports of constrained sectors (cf. Beck, 2002,
2003; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005; Manova, 2008a; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2010).
This research concludes that countries with better developed ﬁnancial institutions have a
comparative advantage in industries which rely more intensively on external ﬁnance, and
7ﬁnancial market liberalization increases exports disproportionately more in ﬁnancially
vulnerable sectors where ﬁrms require more outside ﬁnance and have fewer assets serving
as collateral. The results in Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) indicate that diﬀerences in




We develop a multicountry model of innovation, trade and ﬁnance, including two goods
and two factors in each country. We ﬁrst introduce the structure of the domestic economy,
taking world prices as given. A standard sector produces the numeraire good with a Ri-
cardian technology that transforms one unit of labor into one unit of output, and one unit
of capital into R>1 units of output. The Ricardian technology ﬁxes deposit and wage
rates. The attention mainly focusses on the innovative sector which consists of heteroge-
neous ﬁrms, driven by entrepreneurs who make risky innovation and investment choices.
We think of a ﬁrm as an entrepreneur managing one project. Production combines one
unit of entrepreneurial labor and physical capital I, using a strictly concave technology
θf (I) where θ is total factor productivity as determined by discrete innovation choice.
Entrepreneurs ﬁrst decide on R&D intensity and subsequently choose the level of equip-
8Do and Levchenko (2007) present evidence that ﬁnancial development depends on trade patterns
and argue that ﬁnancial development is endogenous and in part determined by the demand for external
ﬁnancing which might be inﬂuenced by trade patterns shifting towards ﬁnancially dependent sectors.
Beyond trade structure, ﬁnancial constraints reduce the volume of trade by inducing exit of ﬁrms with
below-average productivity (see Manova, 2008b). Very recent work indicates that limited access to
external credit through weak investor protection even reduces foreign direct investment, production, and
trade of multinational companies (see Chor, Foley, and Manova, 2008; Antras, Desai and Foley, 2009),
and alters the decision to deploy technology through foreign direct investment as opposed to arm’s length
technology transfers. However, the latter lies beyond the scope of this paper.
8ment investment. If successful, high R&D spending, k>0, results in a high productivity
level, θ>1. For convenience, we normalize low R&D cost to zero and low productivity
to unity, i.e., k =0leads to θ =1 . Both activities are risky. R&D is successful with
probability q0. Conditional on surviving the R&D stage, capital investment succeeds with
probability p and fails with probability 1 − p.W h e nt h eﬁrm fails, it closes down, before
any output is produced, either in the early R&D or the late expansion investment stage.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous with respect to their innate ability to innovate, char-
acterized by a success probability q0 ∈ [0,1] of the R&D stage. This characteristic is
drawn from the distribution G(q)=
R q
0 g(q0)dq0. More able and innovative entrepreneurs
have a higher chance of turning R&D into a success. At the beginning, all entrepreneurs
start out with the same level of assets A. The sequence of decisions and events is: (i)
Given project type q0, they decide on R&D strategy j which requires a ﬁxed investment
kj ∈ {0,(1 − σ)k}, leaves residual assets Aj = A − kj and determines productivity θj.
Private R&D cost may be reduced by a proportional subsidy σ. (ii) When surviving
the early stage, ﬁrms choose capital investment Ij and apply for credit Ij − Aj,p o s s i b l y
from diﬀerent sources. (iii) Given investment, entrepreneurs supply managerial eﬀort and
banks choose monitoring eﬀort (if necessary). High eﬀort results in a high success prob-
ability p.I fﬁnancing is not incentive compatible, the success probability falls to pL <p .
(iv) Firms produce output and pay back external funds if investment is successful.
The returns to R&D accrue only if a ﬁrm survives the start-up period. Firms with
suﬃciently high survival chances q0 >qwill adopt an aggressive innovation strategy
and opt for a high R&D budget, see below. R&D drains own resources but creates large
investment opportunities, making these ﬁrms ﬁnancially dependent and constrained in the
expansion stage. Firms with less potential abstain from R&D, have undiminished own
resources, are less productive, have few growth opportunities and, by assumption, will be
ﬁnancially unconstrained. Let the subindex j = c refer to constrained, R&D intensive
ﬁrms and u to unconstrained ﬁrms with little (zero) R&D spending. Conditional on their
innovation strategy, ﬁrms expect proﬁts πc >π u from subsequent expansion investment.



















Capital and labor endowments are distributed among risk-neutral agents. There are L
workers without assets who have no managerial talent and can only work in the Ricardian
sector, earning a competitive wage equal to unity. The country also hosts a unitary
mass of wealthy individuals endowed with assets A per capita. A ﬁxed fraction E has
entrepreneurial ability, the others do not. Part 1−E can invest wealth either in deposits
paying a safe interest r (R =1 + r) or in a standard linear investment technology.
Entrepreneurs run a ﬁrm in the innovative sector and earn an expected surplus πE on
top of AR. However, when the business fails, all assets are lost and income drops to
zero. Given an expected rent πE,a l lE agents with entrepreneurial ability indeed prefer
investing in their own ﬁrm rather than the capital market.
Depending on prior R&D choice, ﬁrms diﬀer in productivity and residual assets. To
ﬁnance expansion investment, they need additional external funds. If necessary, a ﬁrm
c a no b t a i nap a r tDm
j of the required funds from active, monitoring banks (e.g., venture
capital, investment banks, ‘Hausbanken’) and the remaining part Dj = Ij−Aj−Dm
j from
other, passive banks. At the end of period, if investment is successful, ﬁrms sell output
xj = θjf (Ij) in the innovative goods market at a relative price v, and undepreciated
capital Ij adds to traditional sector output. An entrepreneur’s expected proﬁt πe
j,e q u a l



















mIj =0 , (2)
π
b
j = p(1 + i)Dj − RDj =0 ,
πj = p(Ij + vxj) − c
mIj − RIj.
Active banks incur monitoring costs cmIj, measured in terms of labor or numeraire output.
Given zero proﬁts of competitive intermediaries, entrepreneurs extract the full surplus
10πe
j = πj. Competition ﬁxes the interest rate i>ron standard business loans and yields
a convenient form of expected proﬁt,
p(1 + i)=R ⇒ πj = p(vxj − iIj) − c
mIj. (3)
3.2 Unconstrained Investment
We ﬁrst turn to the case of standard ﬁrms with little need for external funds. Given
Assumption 1 below, we show that these ﬁrms are unconstrained, are able to invest
at ﬁrst-best levels, take only standard bank loans and have no demand for monitoring
capital. Noting the timing of decisions, we solve backwards. Anticipating the outcomes
in stage (iv), we begin with stage (iii). After external ﬁnancing is arranged, entrepreneurs
and banks know their income shares. If the ﬁrm succeeds, the bank collects repayment
(1 + i)Du on the loan and the entrepreneur obtains residual earnings ye
u ≡ Iu + vxu −
(1 + i)Du. Once the ﬁrm has determined investment and raised external funds, it may
fail due to a lack of managerial eﬀort. Eﬀort may be either high or low, resulting in a
high or low success probability p>p L. When shirking, the success probability and, thus,
expected income is low but the entrepreneur enjoys private beneﬁts BIu.T h es i z eo fh e r
proﬁt stake determines whether the reward is large enough to motivate high eﬀort. High





u + BIu ⇔ y
e
u ≥ IuB/(p>p L). (4)
Assumption 1 (i) At Iu determined by vf0 (Iu)=i,w eh a v eye
u >I uB/(p>p L).
(ii) At Ic determined by vθf0 (Ic)=i,w eh a v eye
c <I cb/(p>p L),w h e r eb<B .
In the ﬁrst-best state, managerial eﬀort is contractible and monitoring is not required
so that monitoring costs are absent. The ﬁrst-best level of investment maximizes expected
proﬁt πe
u = πu in (3) with cm =0 .T h eﬁrm invests until the marginal return is equal to
the user cost of capital,
vf
0 (Iu)=i, πu = p(vxu − iIu). (5)
11Given part (i) of Assumption 1, the incentive constraint is slack at the ﬁrst-best investment
level, see the lower part of Figure 1. Banks are willing to lend the entire desired loan. The
ﬁrm is ﬁnancially unconstrained and relies exclusively on passive bank ﬁnancing without
monitoring. Monitoring capital would only be more expensive but can play no useful role
since there is no need to improve access to external funds.
3.3 Constrained Investment
R&D intensive ﬁrms are highly productive (θc > 1) and have large investment opportuni-
ties but little internal assets as a result of prior R&D spending, Ac = A−(1 − σ)k<A u.
Part (ii) of Assumption 1 means that these two characteristics make innovative ﬁrms
ﬁnance constrained. To relax the constraint and further exploit their investment oppor-
tunities, these ﬁrms might want to demand monitored ﬁnance in addition to standard
bank credit. Assumption 2 below implies that this is a value-increasing strategy in spite
of monitoring capital being more expensive than passive bank ﬁnancing. Active banks
must also cover monitoring cost in addition to the same reﬁnancing cost R p e rd o l l a ro f
credit. Being more expensive, ﬁrms will resort to monitoring capital only to the minimum
extent that still guarantees the desired monitoring and certiﬁcation. The required residual
credit is raised from passive banks. We proceed in two steps and ﬁrst assume that the
ﬁrm applies for monitored ﬁnance in addition to standard bank credit. We then show,
given Assumption 2, that mixed ﬁnancing indeed yields higher value than passive bank
credit alone.
As before, we solve by backward induction. In the eﬀort stage, investment and ﬁnancial
contracts are already determined. Monitoring and passive banks are promised repayment
of ym
c ≡ (1 + im)Dm
c and (1 + i)Dc, respectively, leaving residual earnings ye
c ≡ Ic +
vxc − (1 + i)Dc − ym
c to the entrepreneur. Neither managerial nor monitoring eﬀort are
contractible, leading to a double moral hazard problem. Both eﬀorts are either high or low.
As before, high managerial eﬀort raises the success probability to p>p L while monitoring
reduces private beneﬁts, giving bIc if the entrepreneur is monitored, and BIc if she is not,
12b<B . Monitoring thus makes shirking less rewarding. Proﬁt shares determine whether
rewards are large enough to motivate high monitoring and managerial eﬀort. With active





c + bIc ⇔ y
e








c ≥ γIc,γ ≡ c
m/(p>p L).
The monitoring condition reﬂects the following trade-oﬀ. Suppose the managerial incen-
tive constraint is tight when the bank monitors. Expected repayment to the bank, pym
c ,
then is high. If monitoring is neglected, the manager owner enjoys larger private beneﬁts
and prefers shirking which reduces the success probability to pL. Expected repayment falls
to pLym
c , but the bank can assign employees hired for monitoring to other tasks generating
income cmIc, leading to expected earnings equal to pLym
c +cmIc. The incentive to monitor
consists of the rise in expected income from disciplining the entrepreneur. With double
moral hazard both constraints must be satisﬁed simultaneously. The role of monitoring
is to limit managerial discretion so that entrepreneurs are incentivized with a smaller
income stake, leaving a larger part of cash-ﬂow for repayment to banks. Monitoring thus
raises a ﬁrm’s pledgable income and improves access to external funds.
In stage (ii), the ﬁrm chooses investment and oﬀers contracts to attract both types of
external funds. The contracts must satisfy both incentive constraints and allow external
investors to break even. Given the higher cost, the ﬁrm raises as little active capital as
possible to incentivize monitoring and sets a minimum repayment ym
c = γIc such that the
monitor’s incentive constraint just binds. Given this repayment, the ﬁrm extracts rents
by demanding more funds Dm








mIc)/R =( pγ − c
m)Ic/R. (7)
Reserving part of cash-ﬂow for repayment to monitors reduces the entrepreneur’s
residual income. To assure managerial eﬀort, the owner must keep a minimum income
ye
c ≥ βcIc which is lower with monitoring than without. Hence, βc <β u ≡ B/(p − pL)
13since b<B . Both incentive compatible income stakes limit the amount of repayment that
can be pledged to passive banks. Hence, the ﬁrm’s residual debt capacity is restricted
by (1 + i)Dc ≤ Ic + vxc − γIc − βcIc where βcIc and γIc a r et h o s ep a r t so fp r o ﬁtt h a t
must go to the entrepreneur and the active bank to assure high management eﬀort and
monitoring. The active bank supplies funds Dm
c as in (7). The remaining credit raised
from standard banks which supply Dc = Ic − Ac − Dm
c . Substituting this into the debt
capacity, multiplying by p,u s i n gp(1 + i)=R, and substituting Dm
c from (7) yields
p(vxc − iIc) − c
mIc ≥ pβcIc − RAc,A c = A − (1 − σ)k. (8)
If this ﬁnancing constraint binds, it implicitly determines investment.
Proposition 1 (Constrained investment) With a binding ﬁnance constraint, invest-
ment is not driven by the user cost of capital but depends, instead, on pledgable future
income and on accumulated own assets.
Figure 1 illustrates how investment is determined. The left-hand side of equation (8)
is the expected proﬁt and corresponds to the upper hump-shaped curve. Its maximum
gives the virtual unconstrained investment of an innovative ﬁrm where no excess return
is earned, vx0
c = i. The right-hand side of (8) is the ‘incentive-line’ starting out from the
intercept −AcR. The intersection of these two lines determines the constrained investment
level as in (8). At this point, the slopes satisfy pβc >p(vx0
c − i)−cm > 0. In other words,
the ﬁrm earns an excess return and would like to expand investment but is credit rationed.
Financing a higher level of investment with more external funds would not be incentive
compatible.9 Taking the diﬀerential of (3), we can thus state:
9If ﬁrms asked for a marginally larger credit, incentive constraints would be violated, i.e., ﬁrms and
monitors would shirk and monitoring capital would not be used. Passive banks could still provide credit
by discretely raising the loan rate to iL >iuntil (1 + iL)p = R.P r o ﬁt ve
c would discretely fall due to the
rise in the loan rate iL and the loss in the value-enhancing contribution of monitoring. We must assume
pL low enough to exclude this case. An equilibrium with shirking is deﬁnitely not viable if pL → 0.
14Proposition 2 (Excess return) Expanding investment of constrained ﬁrms would raise
expected proﬁtb ydπc/Ic = ρ,w h e r eρ ≡ p(vx0
c − i) − cm > 0 is the excess return.
Knowing investment yields the amount of monitoring capital Dm
c in (7) and standard
debt Dc = Ic − Ac − Dm
c which is residually obtained from passive banks.
Fig. 1: Constrained and Unconstrained Firm Performance
We now show that mixed ﬁnancing yields a higher surplus and is preferred to exclu-
sive ﬁnancing with a standard bank credit. One may illustrate this matter with Figure
1. If there were no monitoring, private beneﬁt sw o u l db eh i g hw i t hβc = βu,i . e . ,t h e
incentive lines would be parallel. Monitoring constrains private beneﬁts with βc <β u
and, thus, rotates the incentive line of the constrained ﬁrm clockwise. In relaxing the
ﬁnance constraint, investment of the innovative ﬁrm expands and, since it earns an excess
return, expected proﬁt rises. The gains from monitoring are (partly) oﬀset by the fact
that monitoring costs shift down the expected proﬁt line. The ﬁrm will thus demand
monitoring capital only if the gains in relaxing the ﬁnance constraint are larger than the
c o s to fm o n i t o r i n g . M o r ef o r m a l l y ,w es t a r ti nt h ea b s e n c eo fm o n i t o r i n gw h e r eb = B
15and cm =0and consider an introduction and marginal further increase of monitoring in-
tensity m, creating costs dcm/dm > 0 and reducing private beneﬁts by db/dm < 0.M o r e
intensive monitoring reﬂects an increase in monitoring productivity and creates demand
for monitoring capital if the ﬁrm’s expected surplus rises. To see this, take the diﬀerential
of (3), dπc = ρdIc − Icdcm. Monitoring adds extra costs Icdcm, i.e., ‘informed’ capital is
more expensive, which directly reduces expected surplus. The beneﬁto fa t t r a c t i n gm o n -
itoring capital is that it facilitates investment dIc b e c a u s ei tb o o s t st h eﬁrm’s pledgable
income by reducing private beneﬁts. Clearly, if the ﬁrm is severely constrained and excess
return is large, the additional investment substantially augments proﬁts by ρdIc which
may be worth more than the extra cost Icdcm. Demand for monitoring capital exists if
the following assumption on ‘monitoring productivity’ is imposed:
Assumption 2 Monitoring (dm = dcm) is productive and boosts ﬁrm proﬁts:
ρλ > pβc >ρ≡ p(vx
0
c − i) − c






The assumption means that engaging active investors and introducing a small amount
of monitoring activity boosts the ﬁrm’s net present value. To show this, we deﬁne the
relative increase in marginal monitoring cost by10 ˆ cm ≡ dcm/(pβc), and of monitoring
intensity by ˆ m ≡ dm/(pβc). For a given investment level Ic, a higher monitoring in-
tensity yields a percentage reduction in agency costs of ˆ βc = ˆ b = −λˆ m, which implies
an equally large percentage reduction ˆ ye
c = −λˆ m of the minimum, incentive compatible
entrepreneurial compensation. Monitoring thereby raises pledgable income and boosts




· ˆ v +
pβc
δ
· (λˆ m − ˆ cm)+
AR
δIc
· ˆ A +
(1 − σ)kR
δIc
· ˆ σ, δ ≡ pβc − ρ<R , (i)
where R>δassures positive leverage, i.e., dIc/dAc = R/δ > 1.G i v e nb e n e ﬁts and costs,
monitoring (ˆ m =ˆ cm)i sd e s i r a b l eo n l yi ft h en e ti m p a c to ne x p e c t e dp r o ﬁt is positive,
10In general, the subsequent comparative static analysis deﬁnes changes of a variable x relative to its
equilibrium value prior to a given shock by ˆ b = db/b. Exceptions are specially noted.
16i.e., dπc = ρdIc − Icdcm > 0.U s i n gˆ cm =ˆ m and δ,
dπc =( ρλ − pβc)
βcp
δ
Ic · ˆ m>0. (ii)
The condition that monitoring is attractive and demand for ‘informed capital’ arises,
is stated by the ﬁrst inequality in (A2) and consists of two parts: (i) there must be a
suﬃciently large excess return ρ on investment so that the extra investment created by
monitoring leads to a relatively large increase in expected proﬁt. Since unconstrained ﬁrms
do not earn any excess return, they do not beneﬁt from and do not demand monitoring
capital since it would only add to costs. (ii) Monitoring must be productive, i.e., the
elasticity λ must be suﬃciently large.
We interpret ﬁnancial development to mean that active banks get more productive
in monitoring, i.e., monitoring intensity m increases relative to an unchanged marginal
cost cm. Since more intensive monitoring reduces private beneﬁts of entrepreneurs, the
incentive line in Figure 1 becomes ﬂatter and rotates clockwise around the intercept. In
reducing the entrepreneur’s incentive compatible income, monitoring boosts the ﬁrm’s
debt capacity and leads to a larger level of investment.
Innovative ﬁrms have little own assets and large investment opportunities and are
heavily reliant on external funds. Being constrained, they beneﬁt from monitoring which
improves access to capital and allows them to invest more. Since active ﬁnance is more
costly, ﬁrms raise only the minimum amount necessary to guarantee monitoring, and
obtain the remaining credit from standard banks. Firms thus ﬁnance themselves from
multiple sources. The more productive monitoring is, the more external funds ﬁrms can
raise, and the closer they come to the unconstrained regime. We consider only a marginal
increase in monitoring productivity so that credit constraints are only partly relaxed and
innovative ﬁrms are still rationed.11 Standard, less innovative ﬁrms have relatively large
11Starting from a situation where assumption A2 holds, we must assume that the condition also holds
after a marginal change in monitoring productivity. Note that A2 cannot hold in the unconstrained case
with ρ =0 . Hence, demand for monitoring capital must vanish before ﬁnancial constraints are fully
relaxed. Informed capital is useful only for suﬃciently constrained ﬁrms, pointing to a deep parameter
17own assets and few investment opportunities. They are thus able to ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best
investment level and earn no more than the normal return on capital.
Figure 1 compares investment and proﬁt of constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms. If
innovative ﬁrms had more own funds and if agency costs were smaller, they could invest
the ﬁrst-best level of capital. Due to higher productivity, virtual investment and proﬁt
would clearly be larger than for standard ﬁrms. As illustrated in Figure 1, we impose
parameter restrictions such that the ﬁnance constraint becomes binding and represses
investment and proﬁt but only to an extent such that innovative ﬁrms invest at a larger
scale and earn larger proﬁts than standard ﬁrms, Ic >I u and πc >π u.
3.4 R&D Choice
Firms are assumed to be heterogeneous in their innovation potential which is measured by
the success probability of early stage R&D. After making a draw q0 from the distribution
G(q),t h eﬁrm chooses the level of R&D, either k or zero. The private cost is possibly
subsidized. Firms with a type q0 project invest in R&D if q0πc−(1 − σ)kR ≥ q0πu, giving
the cut-oﬀ12
q =( 1− σ)kR/(πc − πu). (9)
Figure 2 illustrates how discrete innovation choice splits the entrepreneurial sector into
innovative and standard ﬁrms. Types q0 <qstrictly prefer to avoid R&D spending while
types q0 >qinvest in R&D which turns them into highly productive growth companies.
Ex ante, before the type of project is revealed, ﬁrms innovate with probability sk and
















restriction determining the existence of a market for informed capital. In the ﬁrst-best benchmark, a
market for monitoring capital no longer exists.
12We focus on interior equilibria, q<1, where the proﬁtd i ﬀerential induced by innovation is large
relative to the ﬁxed R&D cost.
18From E ﬁrms in the entrepreneurial sector, a share sk engages in R&D. Only sc <s k of
them continues, the remaining part sk−sc fails in the R&D stage. Similarly, a share 1−sk
does not invest in R&D and of those only a share su < 1 − sk continues with expansion
investment. Of all sjE ﬁrms surviving the early stage, only psjE produce output. Hence,
more and more ﬁrms get eliminated over their life-cycle.
Expected proﬁt ex ante, anticipating R&D and expansion investments, amounts to
πE = suπu + scπc − (1 − σ)kRsk > 0. (11)




q [(πc − πu)q0 − (1 − σ)kR]dG(q0) is positive
since πc >π u > 0,a n dr e ﬂects a rent on entrepreneurial ability. The square bracket is
zero for the cut-oﬀ q but strictly positive for q0 >q .
Fig. 2: R&D Choice
The R&D choice naturally dichotomizes innovative sector ﬁrms into cash-poor growth
companies and cash-rich, but less productive standard ﬁrms. Innovative growth compa-
nies are highly productive but prior R&D leaves them with low assets. Credit rationing
prevents them to fully exploit investment opportunities. Furthermore, early stage R&D
19endogenizes the fraction of constrained ﬁrms in the innovative sector. Hence, ﬁnance
constraints operate on the extensive and intensive margins of business investment.
3.5 General Equilibrium
Income is spent on goods according to preferences that are assumed linearly separable
in consumption and private beneﬁts Bi (leisure). Utility is linearly homogeneous in con-
sumption ciN and ciE of standard and innovative goods. Given end of period income yi
and a relative price v, demand follows from
ui =m a x
ciN,ciE
u(ciN,ciE)+Bi s.t. ciN + vciE 6 yi. (12)
Given incentive compatibility, private beneﬁts are zero. Welfare thus equals real income,
ui = yi/vD, and changes by ˆ ui =ˆ yi − ˆ vD where a hat denotes relative changes. The
price index vD (v) adjusts by ˆ vD = ηˆ v. Without loss of generality, we specialize to Cobb
Douglas preferences so that expenditure shares η ≡ vciE/yi and 1 − η ≡ ciN/yi are ﬁxed.
Equilibrium reﬂects optimal behavior, budget constraints, and market clearing in loan-
able funds and sectoral output markets. By Walras’ law, one of these conditions is implied
by the others. The loanable funds market is
A(1 − E)+Ac (sk − sc)E + Au (1 − sk − su)E =
P
j (Ij − Aj)sjE + Z + σkskE.
The supply of loanable funds on the left-hand side consists of (i) savings of 1−E investors;
(ii) residual savings Ac = A−(1 − σ)k of failed innovative ﬁrms; and (iii) residual savings
Au = A of failed standard ﬁrms. Demand on the right-hand side includes (i) loans for
expansion investments of both types of ﬁrms; (ii) investment in the safe Z-technology;
and (iii) government debt issued to ﬁnance upfront R&D subsidies. Rearranging yields
A = Z + K · E, K ≡ skk + ¯ I, ¯ I ≡
P
j sjIj, (13)
where K denotes average investment per ﬁrm, consisting of R&D and expansion invest-
ment, and Z is residual investment in the Ricardian sector.
20At the end of the period, the government collects a per-capita tax T from workers.
Since R&D subsidies are due at the beginning, it must raise funds σkskE on the deposit
market to subsidize innovating ﬁrms, and it pays back R t i m e sa sm u c ha tt h ee n do f
period. The ﬁscal budget is
TL= σk · skER. (14)
Depending on occupational activity and on success and failure in entrepreneurship, a
speciﬁc person i may have quite diﬀerent income. Workers are subject to a lump-sum
tax T, giving income yL =1− T per capita. Investors earn yI = AR independent of
asset allocation. Entrepreneurial talent being scarce, entrepreneurs obtain positive rents
on average, yE = AR + πE. Total income is Y = πEE + AR + yLL.D e ﬁne average
values by ¯ x ≡
P
j sjxj, and similarly for ¯ I. Substituting πE and πj,t h eﬁscal constraint
yields aggregate income Y =
£¡¯ I + v¯ x
¢
p − ¯ IR− cmIcsc − kRsk
¤
E +AR+L,w h e r ecmIc
is the resource cost of monitoring per innovative ﬁrm which reduces sector 2 output. Use
now the capital market condition (13), deﬁne sectoral outputs XE and XN, and note the
consumer budget in (12) to obtain the income expenditure identity,
CN + vCE = Y = vXE + XN,X E ≡ ¯ xpE, XN ≡ L + ZR+ ¯ IpE− c
mscIcE. (15)
The trade balance condition in open economies is (CN − XN)+v(CE − XE)=0 .
Arbitrage and linearity of the Ricardian investment technology ﬁxes the deposit factor
R and the loan rate i by (3). Innovative sector investment ¯ I is determined by interest rates
a n daw o r l dr e l a t i v ep r i c ev. Equilibrium in the loanable funds market thus residually
determines investment Z in the standard sector. Innovation choice ﬁxes the composition
of ﬁrms in the entrepreneurial sector. Computing aggregate income Y yields the demand
side and the trade balance. World market clearing for the innovative good ﬁxes the relative
price v. Finally, Walras’ law implies equilibrium in the world market for standard goods.
In a closed economy, v clears the innovative goods market CE = XE, implying market
clearing in the standard sector as well.
214 Small Open Economy
In this section, we study how three distinct areas of policy intervention, import protection,
R&D subsidies and ﬁnancial development, can shape the trade structure and aﬀect welfare
in a small open economy. When analyzing import protection, we assume the country to
be an importer of innovative goods.13 Buyer arbitrage links domestic and foreign prices
by v = τv∗ where τ > 1 is a measure of non-tariﬀ barriers. A small open economy cannot
aﬀect the common world price v∗ of the innovative good in all other countries. Hence,
import protection raises the domestic price by ˆ v =ˆ τ. When studying the R&D subsidy,
we assume the initial equilibrium to be untaxed, i.e., σ = T =0at the outset.
4.1 Firm Level Adjustment
Standard and innovative ﬁrms react in diﬀerent ways to economic shocks. Given that
interest rates are pinned down in the Ricardian sector, investment of unconstrained ﬁrms
in (5) exclusively depends on the output price. Using xj = θj (Ij)
α,







A higher price boosts investment and proﬁts of standard ﬁrms, where the change in proﬁts
reﬂects the envelope theorem.
By way of contrast, constrained investment reﬂects a ﬁrm’s debt capacity and is deter-
mined in (8). Investment is not driven by the user cost of capital but rather depends on
the determinants of pledgable income, such as the level of monitoring and of own assets
Ac. For example, improvements in the banking sector may result in better oversight of
ﬁrms which reduces incentive compatible entrepreneurial compensation and strengthens
pledgable income. We interpret ﬁnancial development as an increase in monitoring pro-
ductivity of active banks, given a ﬁxed marginal cost cm. The investment response of
13If the country were an exporter, we could investigate an export tax to raise the domestic price.
22constrained ﬁrms is stated in equation (i) following (A2). To compare with the uncon-
strained case, we rewrite this condition as
ˆ Ic =( ε + φv) · ˆ v + φσ · ˆ σ + φm · ˆ m, (17)











Setting φ-coeﬃcients to zero recovers the unconstrained case where expansion investment
is independent of R&D subsidies and monitoring, leaving ˆ Ic = εˆ v as with standard ﬁrms.
A higher price stimulates investment of constrained ﬁrms as well although the price
elasticity is generally not the same. The mechanism, however, is entirely diﬀerent. The
stimulus comes from the increased cash-ﬂow and not from the change in the user cost.
Financial sector development in terms of higher monitoring productivity also raises the
ﬁrm’s pledgable income and debt capacity and thereby boosts investment by facilitat-
ing access to external credit. Since monitoring cannot play a useful role when ﬁrms are
unconstrained, it does not aﬀect standard ﬁrm investment. Finally, the R&D subsidy
strengthens the ﬁrm’s own equity after R&D spending, thereby relaxes the ﬁnance con-
straint and boosts expansion investment. This is a novel role for R&D subsidies! The
direct eﬀect of the subsidy is to reduce private R&D cost and stimulate innovation on the
extensive margin. However, the subsidy also helps innovative ﬁrms to better exploit the
productivity gains from innovation and the associated investment opportunities which
earn an above normal, excess return. Since the R&D subsidy is already sunk at the
expansion stage, this second eﬀect does not exist when ﬁrms are unconstrained.
Unlike in the neoclassical case, constrained ﬁrms earn an excess return since they are
unable to fully exploit investment opportunities. For this reason, proﬁts rise with higher
investment levels, dπc = pvxc · ˆ v + ρIc · ˆ Ic.R e l a x i n gt h eﬁnance constraint and boosting
investment yields additional proﬁt in proportion to the excess return ρ net of marginal
23monitoring cost.14 Substituting the investment response gives
dπc =[ pvxc + ρIc (ε + φv)] · ˆ v + ρIcφσ · ˆ σ + ρIcφm · ˆ m. (18)
The R&D subsidy boosts proﬁt ex ante, net of the subsidy as in (11), but does not
directly change proﬁts πj in the expansion stage. Nevertheless, the subsidy indirectly
boosts proﬁt since it relaxes the ﬁn a n c ec o n s t r a i n ta n da l l o w st h eﬁrm to invest more at
an above-average, excess return.
Any policy that strengthens expected proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms relative to others leads
more ﬁrms at an early stage to pursue an innovation strategy. Directly subsidizing the
R&D cost similarly boosts innovation. Evaluating the changes at the untaxed equilibrium
with σ =0 , the impact on the innovation threshold is ˆ q = −(dπc − dπu)/(πc − πu) − ˆ σ




ˆ Ic − ˆ σ. The second term would not be present in the
ﬁrst-best case. In this case, the subsidy would shift up the proﬁtl i n en e to fR & Dc o s to f
an innovative ﬁrm in Figure 2 (not drawn), leading to a lower innovation threshold. When
ﬁrms are constrained, the subsidy additionally boosts investment and strengthens proﬁts,
thereby rotating the proﬁt line to the left and inducing even more innovation. The ﬁgure
also illustrates the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on innovation. Since monitoring is
useful only when ﬁrms are constrained, it cannot play a role in the ﬁrst-best equilibrium.
However, since a higher monitoring intensity boosts the debt capacity of constrained
ﬁrms, it facilitates larger investments with an above-normal return and thereby selectively
strengthens proﬁts of innovative relative to standard ﬁr m s . A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e3 ,t h e
proﬁt line net of R&D cost rotates to the left and thereby lowers the innovation threshold.
Formally, by substituting the investment response in (17), we ﬁnd a change in the cut-oﬀ
probability equal to
ˆ q = −μv · ˆ v − μσ · ˆ σ − μm · ˆ m, (19)
14Setting ρ =0recovers the unconstrained case. Firms would not want monitoring capital on top of
passive bank credit so that cm =0 . The impact on proﬁt would be as in (16) since unrestricted investment
drives down the excess return to zero. By the envelope theorem, a variation of investment does not aﬀect
proﬁts of unconstrained ﬁrms with a normal return on capital.
24where all coeﬃcients are deﬁned in positive values,
μv ≡
pv (xc − xu)+ρ(ε + φv)Ic
πc − πu







A declining threshold means that more ﬁrms innovate. All three shocks boost in-
novation at the extensive margin, but only import protection and the R&D subsidy
w o u l dd os oi naﬁrst-best world. Monitoring capital would not be demanded and would
not exist if none of the ﬁrms were constrained. When more ﬁrms adopt an innova-
tion strategy, the share of high-productivity ﬁrms rises, and so does average produc-
tivity in the industry.15 To evaluate welfare consequences, we also need to know the
change in expected proﬁt ex ante, taking account of R&D costs as well. Since com-
positional eﬀects are related by qdsk = dsc = −dsu,a v e r a g ep r o ﬁti n( 1 1 )r i s e sb y
dπE = sudπu + scdπc + kRskdσ +[ ( πc − πu)q − (1 − σ)kR]dsk,w h e r eσ =0initially.
The square bracket is zero by discrete R&D choice in (9). Noting ¯ x =
P
j sjxj,e x p e c t e d
proﬁt ex ante changes by
dπE =[ pv¯ x + ρscIc (ε + φv)] · ˆ v +[ skkR+ ρscIcφσ] · ˆ σ + ρscIcφm · ˆ m. (20)
4.2 Supply, Demand and Welfare
T h en e x ts t e pi st os h o wh o wﬁrm-level investment and innovation determines sectoral
supply, national income and demand. Aggregate supply XE =¯ xpE changes in proportion
to ¯ x = scxc + suxu which is a measure of average output of innovative and standard
ﬁrms. Out of E ﬁrms initially, only a share sc +su =
R 1
0 q0dG(q0) survives the early stage
and p o ft h o s ea r r i v ei nt h em a t u r ep r o d u c t i o ns t a g e . N o t i n gt h ec o m p o s i t i o n a le ﬀects
dsc = −dsu = −qg(q)dq as a result of innovation choice, average output changes by
d¯ x = scdxc + sudxu − (xc − xu)qg(q)dq,o r
ˆ XE = ζx,v · ˆ v + ζx,σ · ˆ σ + ζx,m · ˆ m, (21)
15Average productivity is θE = sc
sc+suθ + su
sc+su.S i n c esc + su is a constant, innovation (ˆ q<0)r a i s e s
average productivity in the industry by dθE = −(θ − 1)
q2g(q)
sc+su · ˆ q.






























Aggregate supply reﬂects intensive and extensive margins. A higher price for innovative
goods, for example, boosts investment and output of both types of ﬁrms. This intensive
margin is related to the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h eζ-elasticities. Further, a higher price induces
more ﬁrms to innovate. For each ﬁrm that is turned from a standard producer into a
highly productive growth company, output rises on the extensive margin by the diﬀerence
in output levels xc−xu,t i m e st h em a s so fﬁrms moving to a higher productivity level. An
R&D subsidy, raises investment of constrained ﬁrms by φσ, translates into higher output
αφσ per ﬁrm. Since the subsidy stimulates investment only of constrained innovative
ﬁrms, the average output gain is scaled by the share scxc/¯ x.I n a ﬁrst-best case, the
subsidy does not aﬀect investment and output on the intensive margin (φσ =0 )b u ti t
still boosts innovation (μσ =1 ) and aggregate output on the extensive margin. Financial
sector development can play no role at all in a ﬁrst-best world (both φm = μm =0 ).
National income consists of capital income of investors and entrepreneurs plus wage
income of workers, Y = AR + πEE +( 1− T)L.U s i n gt h eﬁscal constraint and starting
from an untaxed equilibrium, it changes by dY = EdπE − kskERdσ. Substituting the












where ηs is the GDP share of the innovative sector and coeﬃcients are deﬁned as
ζy,v ≡ ρηiηs (ε + φv),ζ y,σ ≡ ρηiηsφσ,ζ y,m ≡ ρηiηsφm.
We also use ηi for the share of constrained investment in the expected value of output
per ﬁrm. Note how the excess return ρ magniﬁes income gains. In the ﬁrst-best, ρ =0
26and ˆ Y = ηs·ˆ v. The impact of R&D subsidies or ﬁnancial development arises only via the
eﬀect on ﬁnance constraints. These policies thus help to implement additional investments
w i t ha na b o v en o r m a lr a t eo fr e t u r nw h i l et h ea l t e r n a t i v eu s eo fr e s o u r c e si nt h es t a n d a r d
sector, i.e., Z = A −
¡
skk + ¯ I
¢
E in (13), would only earn a normal return, giving ZR at
the end of period. The income gains are, thus, proportional to the excess return ρ earned
by constrained ﬁrms in the innovative sector.
Assuming constant expenditure shares in (12), the demand allocation is vCE = ηY.
Using the change in national income in (21), this yields
ˆ CE = ˆ Y − ˆ v = −
¡
1 − ηs − ζy,v
¢
· ˆ v + ζy,σ · ˆ σ + ζy,m · ˆ m. (23)
Without a ﬁnance constraint (ρ =0 ), a higher price shrinks demand by ˆ CE = −(1 − ηs)ˆ v.
The demand reduction is weakened by the income gains that arise when constrained ﬁrms
are able to expand investment. These gains are proportional to the excess return earned
by R&D intensive ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst-best situation, a small R&D subsidy would not
aﬀect consumption, i.e., the gains to ﬁrms are completely oﬀset by taxes, and ﬁnancial
development would be useless with unconstrained ﬁrms.
A country’s trade structure depends on how deep fundamentals aﬀect excess demand,
ζ ≡ CE − XE.D e ﬁning ˆ ζ ≡ vdζ/Y yields ˆ ζ = η ˆ CE − ηs ˆ XE,o r
ˆ ζ = −ζv · ˆ v − ζσ · ˆ σ − ζm · ˆ m, (24)
where coeﬃcients are, after substitution,
ζv ≡
¡
1 − ηs − ζy,v
¢
η + ζx,vηs > 0,




















As long as ρ is not too large, 1 − ηs >ζ y,v must hold which implies ζv > 0.16 As long as
t h es q u a r eb r a c k e ti sp o s i t i v e ,t h eo t h e rc o e ﬃcients are positive as well. To see this, use
16In the ﬁrst-best case, ρ = φj = μm =0and μσ =1 ,l e a v i n gζm =0 , ζσ = xc−xu
¯ x q2g(q)ηs and









c/xc, ηi = scIc/(vp¯ x) and ρ = p(vx0
c − i) − cm to obtain
scxcα
¯ x
− ρηηi =[ vpx
0
c − ρη]ηi =[ ( 1− η)vpx
0
c + η · (ip + c
m)]ηi > 0.
A higher relative price reduces excess demand and, thereby, imports of innovative goods.
As m a l l( t a x - ﬁnanced) R&D subsidy has the same eﬀect although it appears ambiguous
a priori since the subsidy also boosts income and demand which raises the trade deﬁcit.
However, the supply eﬀect clearly dominates. The same holds for monitoring intensity
which expands investment and supply and thereby reduces excess demand.
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs do not consume private beneﬁts and active banks do not
divert monitoring activities. Agents are compensated with suﬃciently high income stakes
to prevent both types of shirking. Welfare is equal to real income, U = Y/vD,w h e r evD
is the price index and changes by ˆ U = ˆ Y − ηˆ v, giving
ˆ U =[ ρ · ηiηs (ε + φv) − (η − ηs)] · ˆ v + ρ · ηiηsφσ · ˆ σ + ρ · ηiηsφm · ˆ m. (25)
In the ﬁrst-best situation, ˆ U = −(η − ηs)ˆ v, i.e., a higher price reduces welfare of an
import country with η>η s on account of a negative terms of trade eﬀect. However, a
higher price strengthens pledgable income, relaxes ﬁnance constraints and allows ﬁrms in
the innovative sector to realize unexploited investment opportunities with strictly positive
net value. This magniﬁes national income in proportion to the excess return where the
gain is weighed by the investment share of constrained ﬁrms in total output times the
GDP share of the innovative sector, and also depends on the strength of the investment
response. When the output price is given in a small open economy, a small R&D subsidy
boosts welfare since it relaxes the ﬁnance constraint. It thereby strengthens income by
stimulating constrained expansion investment of innovative ﬁr m sw i t ha ne x c e s sr e t u r n .
Financial sector maturation, as measured by a higher monitoring productivity m,i m p r o v e s
ﬁrms’ access to external ﬁnance and boosts investment and proﬁts. Financial development
similarly raises welfare in proportion to ρ.
284.3 Policy Intervention
The following propositions summarize the consequences of seemingly diﬀerent areas of
policy intervention in a small open economy. The statements can be veriﬁed by the
comparative static results in the preceding two subsections. We ﬁrst turn to classical
trade policy, consisting here of protection by raising non-tariﬀ trade barriers. Protection
in an import country raises the domestic price of the innovative good and leads to
Proposition 3 (Protection) In a small open economy, a higher price boosts investment
a n do u t p u to fa l lﬁrms in the innovative sector, but disproportionately raises proﬁts of
constrained ﬁrms. It thereby induces more innovation, strongly expands aggregate supply
and reduces the trade deﬁcit of the innovative sector. If the trade deﬁcit is small, national
welfare rises in proportion to the excess return on investment of constrained ﬁrms.
With a small trade deﬁcit, i.e., η ≈ ηs, the negative terms of trade eﬀect of a higher
price in an import country is also small, yielding a welfare gain from relaxing ﬁnance
constraints. This result might justify a small level of protection to help ‘infant industries’
with many constrained ﬁrms that are unable to fully exploit their growth opportunities.
The existence of ﬁnance constraints might be rooted in weak institutions like bad account-
ing rules, weak investor protection and other weaknesses in corporate governance. These
shortcomings allow for managerial discretion and autonomy (high value of βc), require
large ﬁnancial incentives to incentivize entrepreneurs and narrow down pledgable income
and the ﬁnancing capacity of ﬁrms. They could also be due to a rather immature ﬁnancial
sector with little eﬀective monitoring and oversight of ﬁrms which again restricts access to
external funding. While at least a small degree of protection might help to relax ﬁnance
constraints and yield welfare gains, there might be other policies aiming more directly at
the root of the problem. One possibility is an R&D subsidy which strengthens residual
own assets and thereby helps innovative ﬁrms to gain access to external funding and to
exploit their investment opportunities to a larger extent.
29Proposition 4 (R&D subsidy) In a small open economy with a ﬁxed output price, an
R&D subsidy relaxes the ﬁnance constraint and stimulates investment, output and (expan-
sion stage) proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms while non-innovating ﬁrms are not aﬀected. The
subsidy boosts innovation and thereby raises the share of growth companies in the innova-
tive sector. Aggregate supply expands on intensive and extensive margins and reduces the
trade deﬁcit in R&D intensive goods. National welfare rises in proportion to the excess
return on investment of constrained ﬁrms.
Whereas trade protection raises the output price and thereby stimulates investment
of both R&D intensive and standard ﬁrms in the innovative sector, the R&D subsidy is
speciﬁcally targeted on ﬁnance constrained ﬁrms which are most in need of a subsidy in
order to implement more projects with a strictly above normal rate of return. However,
the aggregate implications are similar.
Finally, we turn to ﬁnancial sector development, meaning that active banks learn to
monitor ﬁrms more eﬀectively without any increase in the marginal cost of monitoring.
The emergence of specialized intermediaries such as investment banks, venture capitalists
or ‘Hausbanken’ with close ties to their client ﬁr m si sd r i v e nb yt h ee x i s t e n c eo fc o n -
strained ﬁrms. The role of these intermediaries is to improve access to the capital market
by monitoring ﬁrms, containing possible managerial misbehavior and, thereby, raising a
ﬁrm’s debt capacity. These banks perform a certiﬁcation role. Observing that a ﬁrm
attracts ﬁnancing from an active investment bank, other more passive banks can trust in
good corporate governance and will be able to lend more as well. By this mechanism, ﬁ-
nancial sector maturation improves access to external ﬁnancing and facilitates investment
of constrained, innovative ﬁrms. Obviously, unconstrained ﬁrms have no problem in rais-
ing external funds and therefore do not demand expensive monitoring capital. Financial
development is inconsequential for these ﬁrms.
Proposition 5 (Financial development) In a small open economy with a ﬁxed out-
put price, a higher monitoring productivity relaxes the ﬁnance constraint and stimulates
30investment, output and (expansion stage) proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms while non-innovating
ﬁrms are not aﬀected. Financial development boosts innovation and thereby raises the
share of growth companies in the innovative sector. Aggregate supply expands on inten-
sive and extensive margins and reduces the trade deﬁcit in R&D intensive goods. National
welfare rises in proportion to the excess return on investment of constrained ﬁrms.
In the empirical literature, the volume of private credit in percent of GDP or the size
of the venture capital market is often taken as a measure of a country’s ﬁnancial devel-
opment. However, this measure is importantly demand-driven and may be unrelated to
deep structural parameters determining the productivity of ﬁnancial intermediation. R&D
subsidies and trade protection of the innovative sector, for example, boost the demand
for active ﬁnance both at the extensive (the share of innovating ﬁrms) and the intensive
margin (investment scale per ﬁrm). The aggregate volume of active lending is Dm
c scE.
In our model, a constrained ﬁrm raises informed capital in proportion to its investment
level. Using the deﬁnition of γ in (7), the level of monitored credit per innovative ﬁrm is
a ﬁx e dp r o p o r t i o no fi n v e s t m e n t ,Dm
c = Ic · cmpL/((p − pL)R). Since both shocks boost
innovation and subsequent capital investment of R&D intensive ﬁrms, the demand for
active ﬁnance expands on extensive and intensive margins. Hence, a larger share of the
country’s ﬁxed supply of assets is channeled through active ﬁnancial intermediaries. This
interpretation of ‘ﬁnancial development’ is entirely demand-driven. The increased moni-
toring capacity as discussed above also boosts innovation and the subsequent growth of
innovative ﬁrms. The volume of informed capital expands qualitatively in the same way,
b u tt h i st i m ei ti sd r i v e nb yar e a lp r o d u c t i v i t yg a i ni nt h eﬁnancial sector.
We have discussed three rather diﬀerent policy areas that could boost welfare in a
small open economy when part of innovative sector ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained. Can
these policies be compared in any way? Given a certain improvement in ﬁnancial sector
eﬃciency, as measured in terms of monitoring intensity, what is the size of the R&D
subsidy and of trade protection that would yield the same welfare gains?
Proposition 6 (Relative policy eﬀectiveness) In a small open economy with a small
31trade deﬁcit in innovative goods, protection, R&D subsidies and ﬁnancial sector devel-
opment have equivalent eﬀects on constrained investment and on national welfare, if the
shocks are related by vpxcˆ v = kRˆ σ = pβcIcλˆ m.
First note that this statement excludes terms of trade eﬀects by assuming balanced
trade, i.e., η = ηs. The aim is to understand how protection aﬀects ﬁnancial frictions by
raising the domestic price and not mix the welfare gains with terms of trade eﬀects. How-
ever, in our model with homogeneous goods, protection is relevant only when the country
is an importer. The proposition thus assumes an ‘inﬁnitesimally small’ trade deﬁcit in
innovative goods so that consumer arbitrage leads to an increase in the domestic price as
a result of protection. Given this qualiﬁcation, and dividing the relationship by δIc yields
(ε + φv)ˆ v = φσˆ σ = φm ˆ m and, thus, equally large eﬀects of the three alternative policies
on constrained ﬁrm investment, see (17), and on national welfare, see (24). Observe, how-
ever, that this policy equivalence does not carry over to innovation or aggregate supply.
Looking at the change in the innovation threshold in (19) shows that the R&D subsidy
boosts innovation more than ﬁnancial sector development since the subsidy boosts inno-
vation even in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions while more intensive monitoring does not.
A similar argument applies to a protection-induced price increase.
5 Large Open Economies
In a large open economy, a supply side expansion reduces the world price of innovative
goods which feeds back negatively on the domestic economy since a lower price erodes
the ﬁnancing capacity of constrained ﬁrms and leads to a counterveiling welfare eﬀect. In
analyzing world equilibrium, we assume the home country to be an importer of innovative
goods so that the rest of the world in total must be exporting, although each individual
foreign country may be an importer or an exporter. When the home economy is importing
innovative goods, the price at home rises with import protection, v = τv∗,r e l a t i v et ot h e
common world price v∗ in all other countries, where τ =1and v = v∗ at the outset.
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v is the GDP weighted average of individual country elasticities. The small open
economy case results if the number of countries n gets large. This is most easily seen in the
symmetric case where ζ
∗
v = ωnζv,l e a d i n gt oˆ v = −(ζσ/(nζv)) ˆ σ.A sn →∞(implying
ω → 0), an isolated shock in the domestic economy has only a negligible impact on the
world market price. In a closed economy with n = ω =1 , protection is irrelevant and the
equilibrium price follows from ˆ ζ =0in (24).
5.1 Protection
If the home economy introduces non-tariﬀ import barriers, it raises the domestic price
above the world price level, ˆ v =ˆ v∗ +ˆ τ.T h e t r a d e d e ﬁcit shrinks which creates excess
supply on the world market and depresses the world price, see (26). Since ωζv/ζ
∗
v < 1,
protection raises the domestic price, but less than in a small open economy,
ˆ v =( 1− ωζv/ζ
∗
v) · ˆ τ>0. (27)
Proposition 3 still applies, i.e., protection relaxes ﬁnance constraints and induces a supply
expansion. If the trade deﬁcit in innovative goods is small, the home country gains from
a small degree of protection.
We can now state the spillovers on foreign economies. Since all shocks by assumption
occur at home, foreign countries are only aﬀected by a change in the common price v∗.
33Replacing v by v∗ in Section 3 yields the adjustment in a foreign country j.17
Proposition 7 (Protection spillovers) (a) Domestic protection reduces the common
world price v∗ and thereby reduces foreign investments Ij
c and Ij
u, discourages foreign in-
novation by raising the cut-oﬀ values qj,a n dr e d u c e s( m a g n i ﬁes) foreign trade surpluses
(deﬁcits). (b) Domestic protection tightens foreign ﬁnance constraints. Welfare of foreign
export nations strongly falls since the negative terms of trade eﬀect is reinforced by tight-
ening ﬁnance constraints. Welfare of foreign import nations changes ambiguously since
the positive terms of trade eﬀect may be oﬀset by ﬁrms becoming more constrained.
The interplay between welfare eﬀects from terms of trade changes and ﬁnancial fric-
tions can generate interesting results on world welfare that would not be possible if ﬁrm-
level investment were ﬁrst-best in all countries. One interesting possibility is:
Proposition 8 (World welfare) If (i) all countries are close to autarky and terms of
trade eﬀects are small, and if (ii) the home economy is ﬁn a n c ec o n s t r a i n e dw h i l ef o r e i g n
economies are not, domestic protection raises world welfare.
With terms of trade eﬀects being small and foreign countries free of ﬁnancial frictions,
they will not experience any welfare change. For the home economy, Proposition 3 applies.
Being ﬁnancially constrained, it beneﬁts from a strictly positive welfare gain since the
policy boosts investment with an above normal rate of return. Since the home country
gains while no foreign economy looses in this scenario, world welfare rises.
5.2 R&D Subsidies
Instead of protection, the home economy could subsidize R&D to become more compet-
itive in the innovative industry. Intuition is that an R&D subsidy targets ﬁnance con-
17International welfare results from protection are similar to Egger and Keuschnigg (2010). That paper
did not consider an explicit innovation decision and the coexistence of constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms
in the innovative sector. Further, the analysis of trade implications of R&D subsidies and the discussion
of ﬁnancial sector development is new in the present paper.
34straints more directly than protection. In expanding the innovative sector, it drives down
the world price, leading to terms of trade eﬀects on foreign economies that are favorable
or unfavorable depending on their trade balance. A lower world price, however, tightens
ﬁnance constraints in all foreign economies and thereby reduces their welfare. The price
erosion also feeds back negatively on domestic equilibrium, irrespective of whether the
country is a net exporter or importer, and reduces the possible welfare gains. Given (26)
and the results of Section 3, we can state:
Proposition 9 (R&D subsidy in a large country) (a) An R&D subsidy boosts aggre-
gate supply, reduces the world price of innovative goods, and leads to a negative feedback
eﬀect on the domestic economy. Investment of unconstrained ﬁr m sf a l l s .C o m p a r e dt oa
small open economy, the increase in constrained ﬁrm investment, innovation, aggregate
supply and welfare are smaller. (b) The reduction in the world price reduces ﬁrm-level
investments, innovation and trade surpluses in foreign economies. Welfare in foreign ex-
port nations strongly falls due to a tightening of ﬁnance constraints and a deterioration
of terms of trade while welfare changes in foreign import nations are ambiguous.
It is unlikely that the negative feedback eﬀect could overturn the direct eﬀects of an
R&D subsidy as they obtain in a small open economy. Obviously, the smaller the share
ω of the home economy in world GDP is, the smaller is the impact on the world price v∗,
and the smaller are the negative feedback eﬀects. The feedback eﬀect from a declining
output price is strongest in the closed economy. If we can show the welfare gain to be
positive in a closed country, it will a fortiori be positive in an open economy since the
negative feedback is weaker. In Appendix A, we give a condition such that the qualitative
results of the small open economy continue to hold in a closed economy. The condition is
that the supply eﬀect from induced innovation is not too strong, i.e., not too many ﬁrms
switch from standard, low volume producers to innovative, high volume producers.
355.3 Financial Development
More eﬀective monitoring and better oversight of ﬁrms boosts the debt capacity of in-
novative ﬁrms which face the tightest constraint in raising outside funds. Financial de-
velopment thus triggers a supply side expansion and drives down the world price by
ˆ v∗ = −(ωζm/ζ
∗
v)ˆ m, see (25). The lower price reduces investment and output of uncon-
strained, standard ﬁrms and retards the expansion of constrained innovative companies.
The beneﬁcial eﬀects are thus scaled down.
Proposition 10 (Financial development in a large country) The reduction in the
world price dampens the supply-side expansion in the home country. Investment and
proﬁts of unconstrained ﬁrms fall. Compared to a small open economy, the increase in
constrained ﬁrm investment and proﬁt is smaller, implying a smaller increase in innova-
tion and welfare, and a smaller reduction of the trade deﬁcit in innovative goods. (b) The
declining world price reduces ﬁrm-level investments, innovation and trade surpluses in
foreign economies. Welfare in foreign export nations strongly falls due to a tightening of
ﬁnance constraints and a deterioration of terms of trade while welfare changes in foreign
import nations are ambiguous.
I nA p p e n d i xB ,w eg i v ec o n d i t i o n ss u c ht h a tt h eq u a l i t a t i v er e s u l t so ft h es m a l lo p e n
economy continue to hold in a closed economy. So they must hold a fortiori in large open
economies where the negative feedback eﬀect is weaker.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
To investigate the interaction between innovation, ﬁnance and trade, we have proposed a
multi-country, two-sector model with capital and sector speciﬁc labor. A discrete R&D
decision splits ﬁrms into innovative and standard ones. Standard ﬁrms are unconstrained
a n di n v e s ta tl o ws c a l eu n t i lt h er a t eo fr e t u r ni se q u a lt ot h ec o s to fc a p i t a l .G i v e np r i o r
36R&D spending, innovative ﬁrms are left with little own assets, are highly productive and
could invest at a large scale in the subsequent expansion stage but are credit rationed.
These assumptions reﬂect the stylized fact that more innovative and (in terms of own
assets) smaller ﬁrms, have greater diﬃculty in raising external funds than others. With
investment being restricted, innovative ﬁr m se a r na ne x c e s sr e t u r no nc a p i t a la n dh a v e
unexploited investment opportunities. The credit constraint is partly relaxed by special-
ized intermediaries which actively monitor and supervise ﬁrms, thereby raise their debt
capacity and allow them to proﬁtably invest at a larger scale.
Using this framework, we investigate the role of three alternative policy instruments
which aﬀect ﬁnancial frictions in distinct ways. These instruments are trade protection
of the innovative sector, R&D subsidization,a n dﬁnancial sector development. While all
three policies reduce ﬁnancial frictions and yield welfare gains at home, the consequences
on foreign welfare are less clear-cut and depend on the speciﬁc interaction of terms of
trade eﬀects and ﬁnancial frictions. The reduction in the world price strongly hurts
foreign export nations, not only because of a negative terms of trade eﬀect, but also
because a lower price tightens ﬁnance constraints. Welfare in foreign import countries
changes ambiguously since terms of trade and ﬁnancial frictions work in opposite ways.
Appendix
A. R&D Subsidy in a Closed Economy In autarky, where η = ηs,a nR & Ds u b s i d y
reduces the equilibrium output price by ˆ v = −(ζσ/ζv) · ˆ σ. Plugging into (25) yields
ˆ U = ρηiη[(ε + φv)ˆ v + φσˆ σ] or
ˆ U = ρ · ηiηΩσ/ζv · ˆ σ, Ωσ ≡ φσζv − (ε + φv)ζσ. (A.1)
37C l e a r l y ,t h e r ei sa na m b i g u o u sw e l f a r ee ﬀect that stems from the negative consequences












Γ ≡ (ε + φv)μσ − μvφσ =[ ( 1− q)xc + qxu]pv/(δIc) > 0,
where the last equality uses q = kR/(πc − πu). The subsidy boosts welfare if innovation
and ﬁrm composition are exogenous or inelastic (μσ → 0, μv → 0 implying Γ → 0 and
Ωσ > 0). The coeﬃcient Ωσ is also positive if xc−xu
¯ x q2g(q) is small, i.e., if the subsidy
moves only a few ﬁrms from the unconstrained to the constrained regime.
The falling price also oﬀsets the direct eﬀect of the subsidy on constrained investment.
Substituting the equilibrium price change into ˆ Ic =( ε + φv) · ˆ v + φσ · ˆ σ yields
ˆ Ic = Ωσ/ζv · ˆ σ, (A.2)
where Ωσ = φσζv − (ε + φv)ζσ is given above and is positive under the same conditions.
Finally, by (19), the extensive innovation margin in a closed economy changes by
ˆ q = −μv · ˆ v − μσ · ˆ σ = −
Ωq
ζv
· ˆ σ, Ωq ≡ μσζv − μvζσ > 0. (A.3)
Noting Γ =( ε + φv)μσ − μvφσ from above yields
Ωq = μσ
h











ηsφσμv − ρηηiηs · Γ,
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where the second line follows upon expanding φv in the ﬁrst square bracket to φv +ε−ε.
Since scxcα
¯ x − ρηηi > 0 as noted subsequent to (24), an R&D subsidy clearly boosts
innovation in a closed economy as well. In the ﬁrst-best, ρ and all φ-coeﬃcients are zero
and μσ =1 , giving Γ = ε and Ωq =( 1− ηs)η + αεηs, which is clearly positive.
B. Financial Development in a Closed Economy: In autarky, the price reduction
is ˆ v = −(ζm/ζv)ˆ m. Plugging into (25) yields ˆ U = ρηiηs [(ε + φv)ˆ v + φm ˆ m] or
ˆ U = ρ · ηiηsΩm/ζv · ˆ m>0, Ωm ≡ φmζv − (ε + φv)ζm > 0. (B.1)
38By rewriting the coeﬃcient Ωm, we can show it to be positive,
Ωm = φm
h














Clearly, ﬁnancial development boosts welfare in a closed economy.
Constrained investment changes by ˆ Ic =( ε + φv)ˆ v + φm ˆ m. Substituting the equilib-
rium price cut leaves a net positive investment stimulus in the closed economy,
ˆ Ic =( Ωm/ζv) · ˆ m. (B.2)
The innovation threshold in (19) changes by ˆ q = −μvˆ v − μm ˆ m,w h i c hg i v e s
ˆ q = −Ω/ζv · ˆ m, Ω ≡ μmζv − μvζm. (B.3)
To sign of Ω,n o t eΓm > 0,e x p a n dφv to φv + ε − ε and collect terms involving Γm,
Ω = μm
h











where the term scxc
¯ x α − ρηηi is positive by the result noted after (24). So, in principle,
ﬁnancial development aﬀects innovation ambiguously since Γm i sp o s i t i v e . I na no p e n
economy, the feedback via the declining output price is scaled down, so that innovation
must be encouraged if the economy’s weight in the world economy is not too large.
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